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LET’S NOT GIVE UP ON TRADITIONAL FOR-PROFIT
CORPORATIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL
ENTERPRISE
Joan MacLeod Heminway*
The past ten years have witnessed the birth of (among other legal
business forms) the low-profit limited liability company (commonly known as
the L3C), the social purpose corporation, and the benefit corporation.1 The
benefit corporation has become a legal form of entity in over 30 states.2 The
significant number of state legislative adoptions of new social enterprise forms of
entity indicates that policy makers believe these alternative forms of entity serve
a purpose (whether legal or extra-legal).
The rise of specialty forms of entity for social enterprise, however, calls
into question, for many, the continuing role of the traditional for-profit
corporation (for the sake of brevity and convenience, denominated “TFPC” in
this essay) in social enterprises, including green economy ventures.3 This essay
argues that TFPCs continue to be a viable—and in many cases desirable or
advisable—choice of entity for sustainable social enterprise firms. The
arguments presented are founded in legal doctrine, theory, and policy and include
both legal and practical elements.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NATURE OF SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL
ENTERPRISE
It is commonly understood that social enterprises are businesses that
generate positive social or environmental welfare in some sense. Most
definitions of social enterprise comport with that broad conception. Definitions
of social enterprise abound in legal scholarship and elsewhere. Context often
matters. Social enterprise defined too narrowly in context may fail to capture
business conduct that is important to a particular inquiry. Yet, social enterprise
defined too broadly in context includes business conduct that may not be valued

*

Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law. New
York University School of Law, J.D. 1985; Brown University, A.B. 1982. I gratefully
acknowledge the roles of Tony Luppino, Irma Russell, and John Tyler, among others, in
encouraging my work on this essay.
1 See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 541, 543-55
(2016).
2
See
State
by
State
Status
of
Legislation,
BENEFIT
CORPORATION,
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Feb. 1, 2018) (tallying states
that have adopted what B Lab classifies as benefit corporation legislation, which does not include
all states with benefit corporation legislation, e.g., Tennessee.).
3 See, e.g., Kennan Khatib, Comment, The Harms of the Benefit Corporation, 65 AM. U. L. REV.
151, 151 (2015) (arguing, among other things, that, “due to the increasingly accepted notion that
profitability and the pursuit of social and environmental impact are no longer mutually exclusive
concepts,” the TFPC is an appropriate choice for social enterprises in most contexts.).
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in a particular analysis. One scholar-practitioner in the field summarizes the
quandary nicely:
The term “social enterprise” does not have a precise definition
and as such, while often used, it is also commonly
misunderstood. The term is evolving as it continues to be refined
and contoured by business and legal practitioners and
scholars. As the term suggests, it describes those business
enterprises that intentionally impact societal good.
Precise definitions matter because there is misuse and
confusion about how business ventures are determined to be
social enterprises. The definitional variations are diverse enough
to inspire a semester-long course I teach aimed at better
understanding the meaning of the term social enterprise.4
Accordingly, it is always best to define the concept of social enterprise in a
situational manner—for the specific setting in which the term is being used.
The thesis of this essay was conceived in connection with The Bryan
Cave/Edward A. Smith Symposium: The Green Economy, held in October 2017
at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law.5 As a result, the type
of social enterprise it most centrally contemplates is a for-profit firm operating in
the green economy. The green economy is itself a contended concept,6 further
complicating the process of defining social enterprise for use in this essay. In
general, however, “the term ‘green economy’ describes economic development
that is limited by ‘green’ considerations, which means, above all, environmental
considerations.”7
This essay also qualifies its target subject firm by reference to
sustainability. Sustainability, broadly writ, focuses on the capacity of a firm to
operate and grow while maintaining a limited environmental footprint. As such,
sustainability is related closely to conceptions of the green economy. One author
links the green economy to sustainability in a compelling manner:
[T]he idea of green economy is closely related to the notion of
green growth: the process of “making growth processes

4 Alina S. Ball, Social Enterprise Governance, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 919, 926-27 (2016) (footnotes
omitted).
5
The Bryan Cave/Edward A. Smith Symposium: The Green Economy, UMKC SCHOOL OF LAW,
https://law.umkc.edu/greeneconomysymposium/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2018).
6 See, e.g., Hilary Kao, Beyond Solyndra: Examining the Department of Energy's Loan Guarantee
Program, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 425, 433-34 (2013) (setting forth various
definitions of “green economy”).
7 Woong Kyu Sung, Core Issues in International Sustainable Development: Analysis of Shifting
Priorities at U.N. Environmental Conferences, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,574,
10,592 (2014).
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resource-efficient, cleaner and more resilient without necessarily
slowing them.” The idea of green economy operates therefore as
a possible bridge between the demands of global capitalism and
the vision of sustainability.8
Thus, sustainability may be conceptualized as a potential specific operating
objective of a social enterprise firm operating in the green economy. That
objective may involve fundamental changes in the substructure (ideals and
fundamental policies) of firms or mere pro-environmental changes in the manner
in which they conduct business (the latter sometimes being specifically identified
as “sustainability development.”).9
To synthesize, then, a sustainable social enterprise firm serves public
benefit purposes and does so in a manner that ensures the ongoing operations and
development of the business in the social, economic, and environmental context
in which it exists. “Sustainable development offers a new paradigm that shifts
away from the perceived duty businesses have of achieving economic growth
solely by maximizing shareholder profits. Instead, it moves toward a more
inclusive and desirable business structure that can promote both the economic
bottom line and environmental sustainability.”10 Sustainable social enterprises
are thus focused on attaining social, environmental, and financial objectives
through and in their business operations. In this way, they operate in a manner
consistent with the concept of “shared value” championed by Professors Michael
Porter and Mark Kramer.11 They also incorporate both a triple bottom line and a

8 Oren Perez, The Green Economy Paradox: A Critical Inquiry into Sustainability Indexes, 17
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 153, 155-56 (2016) (footnote omitted).
9 See Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Paul Shrivastava, Beyond Compliance: Sustainable Development,
Business, and Proactive Law, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 417, 423 (2015).

The sustainability movement explicitly asserts that economic development and
employment opportunities are not antithetical to environmental concerns.
Consequently, the movement extends sustainability to include social concerns
over how environmentally sensitive development can be managed to enhance
global equity and equality of material well-being. Sustainability also
incorporates political and cultural concerns in economic development, but to a
lesser extent than their primary focus. It supports development processes that
preserve and respect longstanding diverse cultures, foster development on a
human-scale, and are conducive to politically stable democracies.
Id. at 425.
10
Gina Iacona, Going Green to Make Green: Necessary Changes to Promote and Implement
Corporate Social Responsibility While Increasing the Bottom Line, 26 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
113, 114 (2010).
11 See Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. - Feb.
2011, at 62.
The concept of shared value . . . recognizes that societal needs, not just
conventional economic needs, define markets. It also recognizes that social
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“gearing up” framework.12 Not all social enterprises are sustainable businesses;
not all sustainable businesses are social enterprises.
With the foregoing in mind, this essay focuses on social enterprise in a
relatively broad context that incorporates green economy firms.
More
specifically, the essay hones in on for-profit social enterprise green economy
corporations that operate in a sustainable manner. Thus, the target firm that
inspires the thought and observations reflected in this essay prioritizes short-term
and long-term environmental considerations as well as shareholder wealth
generation in its business decision-making.13
II. LEGAL DOCTRINAL PRINCIPLES ALLOW FOR THE USE OF
TFPCS FOR SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
In a recent essay published in the Washington & Lee Law Review, I
established that there is little in the way of corporate law—from broad statutory
authority regarding, e.g., corporate purpose to decisional law interpreting and
filling gaps in the statutory framework—that supports a pure shareholder wealth
maximization principle in corporate management.14 I further noted, however,
that public impressions often are to the contrary.15 These impressions are rooted
in the dominant place that Delaware law, and in particular the Delaware Court of
Chancery’s opinion in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,16 play in
discussions about management fiduciary duties as a matter of corporate law.
While eBay is a single trial court decision, it tends to carry great weight in
debates over both corporate board decision-making and the objective of the
corporation as a legal form of entity. Accordingly, eBay often plays a role in
harms or weaknesses frequently create internal costs for firms—such as wasted
energy or raw materials, costly accidents, and the need for remedial training to
compensate for inadequacies in education. And addressing societal harms and
constraints does not necessarily raise costs for firms, because they can innovate
through using new technologies, operating methods, and management
approaches—and as a result, increase their productivity and expand their
markets.
Id. at 65.
See Judd F. Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and A New Paradigm for
Corporate Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 991-95 (2009) (identifying the “triple bottom line”
and “gearing up” as “[t]wo complementary ways of operationalizing sustainability in business”).
13 Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise As Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
89, 98 (2015) (“[T]he single value common to all social enterprise is commitment to ameliorating a
social or environmental problem, whatever that problem may be, rather than pursuing solely
shareholder value.”).
14 Joan Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes, Decisional Law,
and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 945-56 (2017) (concluding that “[o]verall, .
. . it would be over-claiming to assert that U.S. state decisional law—any more than U.S. state
statutory law—articulates a clear, legally enforceable shareholder wealth maximization norm as a
matter of substantive corporate doctrine.”).
15 Id. at 955-56.
16 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 46 (Del. Ch. 2010).
12
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choice of entity decisions by affecting the advice that legal counsel offer in entity
selection and formation.17
The language in the eBay opinion is strongly worded and directly
implicates the connection between shareholder wealth considerations and entity
choice. Specifically, in his eBay opinion, Chancellor Chandler avows that:
Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist
directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that
accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote
the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.
The "Inc." after the company name has to mean at least that.
Thus, I cannot accept as valid for the purposes of implementing
the Rights Plan a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and
admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a forprofit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders—
no matter whether those stockholders are individuals of modest
means or a corporate titan of online commerce.18
This passage from the opinion may be read to relegate sustainable social
enterprises—and, more generally, firms that select away from maximizing
shareholder economic value in a particular decision—to organizing either as
unincorporated (rather than corporate) or nonprofit (rather than for-profit)
entities. The latter reading may be given credit notwithstanding the fact that a
nonprofit firm may be a corporation and therefore also may have “Inc.” at the
end of its corporate name.
Delaware’s enactment of legislation authorizing the public benefit
corporation responds directly to the adoption of social enterprise forms of
entity—most particularly the benefit corporation—by legislatures in other
states.19 However, the overall rise of the benefit corporation form (perhaps even
including Delaware’s adoption of public benefit corporations) also responds to
17

See generally Heminway, supra note 14, at 956 (“[A] shareholder wealth maximization norm
also impacts choice of entity, corporate formation, and legal counsel on potential amendments to
corporate organic documents—most especially corporate charters.”).
18 eBay, 16 A.3d at 34.
19 See, e.g., Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who's
Opting in?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 253 (2014) (“Statements from the Delaware Governor's
office illustrate that the Delaware Bar and government saw Delaware's role as the leader in U.S.
corporate law as a primary reason for adopting the public benefit corporation form. . . . Delaware
was not going to allow other states to preempt its influence over this version of corporate law.”);
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors to "Do the Right Thing"?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
235, 243 (2014) (“ . . . Delaware is the domicile for a majority of American public companies and
the preferred domicile for companies seeking to go public. The best pathway forward for benefit
corporations that wish to go public may therefore be through use of the Delaware statute, because
of Delaware's acceptance among institutional investors, corporate managers, and the intermediaries
who raise capital.” (footnote omitted)).
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the perceived strength of shareholder primacy and the shareholder wealth
maximization norm in Delaware corporate law jurisprudence and may be
interpreted as a rejoinder to the eBay opinion.20 This doctrinal conversation
between the Delaware judiciary and the Delaware legislature has, and seemingly
is designed to have, an express, marked impact on entity choice both as to form
and jurisdiction.
Yet, a deeper, more comprehensive reading of the eBay opinion allows
for the construction of a more nuanced view of entity selection in the context of
sustainable social enterprise. Specifically, a sustainable social enterprise firm, as
defined for purposes of this essay, differs from craigslist, Inc., the subject firm in
the eBay case (“craigslist”). Even if organized as a TFPC in Delaware, a
sustainable social enterprise firm does not maintain “a corporate policy that
specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize . . . economic value . .

20

See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with Fly Paper: A Hybrid
Financial Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495, 1510 (2013);
Benefit corporation statutes . . . explicitly reject shareholder wealth maximization.”); Jonathan
Brown, When Social Enterprises Fail, 62 VILL. L. REV. 27, 51 (2017)
(“[T]he passage of benefit corporation legislation transformed the shareholder wealth maximization
norm from a mandatory rule to a default rule that parties may contract out of by electing a social
enterprise legal form.”); William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations
Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 838 (2012)
(“It is against the paradigm of shareholder primacy that benefit corporation statutes have been
drafted.”); Bart Houlahan et al., Berle VIII: Benefit Corporations and the Firm Commitment
Universe, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 299, 300 (2017) (“[A]ll jurisdictions
adopting benefit corporation legislation, whatever model they use, allow corporations to
reject shareholder primacy, and to place the interests of stakeholders (including employees, the
community, and the environment) on par with the interests of shareholders.”); Lyman
Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose,
38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 448 (2013) (“One legislative response to eBay in numerous states already
is the adoption of legislation authorizing the formation of benefit corporations.”); Brett H.
McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit Corporations,
20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 31 (2014) (“[A] core feature of benefit corporations is that their
corporate purpose extends beyond maximizing shareholder wealth created by the corporation.”); J.
Haskell Murray, supra note 1, at 548 (citing to the eBay decision and quotes from it as catalysts for
benefit corporation legislation); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for A ClearEyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 785 (2015) (“[W]hen the General
Assembly wished to provide an option that would allow for the consideration of multiple interests,
it adopted . . . the benefit corporation, which may be formed for the purpose of putting nonstockholder ends—such as the environment or its workers—on a footing equal to stockholders as
ends.”); Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767, 782 (2015)
(“[B]enefit corporation statutes do not preclude making substantial profits; they merely provide that
firms are not bound to maximize profits.”); Michael Vargas, The Next Stage of Social
Entrepreneurship: Benefit Corporations and the Companies Using This Innovative Corporate
Form, BUS. L. TODAY, July 2016, at 1, 2 (“In a traditional corporation, the board is assumed to act
on behalf of the shareholders and, either by law or business norms, manages the company in pursuit
of profit and shareholder value. A chief goal of the benefit corporation movement was to step away
from this narrow corporate purpose . . . .”).

2018]

LET’S NOT GIVE UP

785

. for the benefit of its stockholders.”21 Rather, a sustainable social enterprise
business organized as a TFPC, by definition, prioritizes both its sustainable social
enterprise mission and shareholder wealth generation in its operations. This,
alone, may take sustainable social enterprise firms out of the realm of Chancellor
Chandler’s observations in the eBay decision.
Moreover, facts underlying the eBay opinion’s discussion of shareholder
wealth maximization—addressing the decision of craigslist’s board of directors
to adopt a shareholder rights plan (also known as a “poison pill”)—include the
following:
x
x
x
x
x
x

the board of directors of craigslist was dominated by two of the
three shareholders of the corporation;
the dominating shareholder-directors failed to effectively prove
the nature and value of the distinctive firm culture they asserted
existed at craigslist;
the dominating shareholder-directors eschewed any concern for
shareholder financial wealth;
the dominating shareholder-directors failed to engage in an
informed assessment of alternatives to the adoption of a
shareholder rights plan;
the dominating shareholder-directors had a personal animus
toward their fellow shareholder; and
the dominating shareholder-directors used board decisionmaking to punish their fellow shareholder rather than pursue a
corporate purpose.22

None of these facts found by the court in eBay are attributes inherent in the
structuring or decision-making of a sustainable social enterprise firm based on
the definition included supra Part I.
The facts from eBay listed in the preceding paragraph describe a firm and
decision-making process that collectively give no credit whatsoever to the
generation of shareholder wealth. Because a sustainable social enterprise
organized as a TFPC would be cognizant of, consider, and prioritize in its
decision-making both its sustainable social enterprise mission and shareholder
wealth creation, the eBay decision does not, as a matter of black-letter law or
practical application, exile a sustainable social enterprise to organization as a
non-corporate or non-profit entity, even when the potential corporate law at issue
is the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the law under which
craigslist was organized and, therefore, the eBay case was decided). One must
wonder whether the result in the eBay decision would have been different if the

21
22

eBay, 16 A.3d at 34.
Id. at 33-34.
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dominant shareholder-directors of craigslist had indicated that they weighed
shareholder wealth considerations in the balance and determined that adoption of
the shareholder rights plan was nevertheless in the best interest of craigslist and
its shareholders over the long term.23 In fact, one may read the eBay opinion to
counsel that credible evidence of serious consideration of shareholder wealth
effects by a Delaware corporate board of directors is sufficient to avoid the
breach of fiduciary duty found by the court in eBay (unless, of course, there are
other grounds for the assertion of a breach). However, this reading has not been
validated expressly in any formal way.24
Professor Stefan Padfield eloquently and succinctly substantiates the
view that shareholder wealth maximization can co-exist with sustainable social
enterprise firms organized as TPFCs. Specifically, he observes that
it is incorrect to say that “regular corporations ... cannot take into
consideration social factors” because social factors impact the
shareholder wealth analysis, and not always negatively. In fact,
in determining the best path to maximizing shareholder value,
corporations arguably must consider social factors in order to
satisfy their duty of care to become informed of all material
information reasonably available. The only thing a for-profit
corporation cannot do in a shareholder wealth maximization

23

Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine addressed the possibility that long-term
shareholder wealth maximization may be sufficient to fulfill a manager’s fiduciary duty of loyalty
in a 2012 law review article:

[T]he corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to
pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders. The
directors, of course, retain substantial discretion, outside the context of a
change of control, to decide how best to achieve that goal and the appropriate
time frame for delivering those returns.
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit,
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012).
24 Former Chancellor Chandler, author of the eBay opinion, posited a reading somewhat akin to this
at an academic symposium in 2016. Anne Tucker reported on his remarks in a contemporaneous
blog post:
Former Chancellor Chandler discussed the Delaware case law interpretation of
shareholder value and its place in analyzing corporate transactions. While
these aren't words that he used, I have been thinking a lot about this . . . as a
question of complimenting or competing . . . . [A] Delaware court will
invalidate a board of directors' other serving actions only if they are in conflict
with shareholder value, but never when it is complimentary. And there is an
expanding appreciation of when "other interests" are seen as complimentary to,
and not in competition with, shareholder value maximization.
Anne Tucker, “Inc.” Means Something, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: BUS. L. PROF BLOG (June
29,
2016),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/06/inc-meanssomething.html#comments.
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regime is knowingly sacrifice shareholder value, whether
calculated in the short- or long-term, in pursuit of some social
end.25
Although his observations are not specifically targeted to sustainable social
enterprise firms, they are applicable to and in that context.
It also is significant to note that the eBay decision is a trial court decision
that construes Delaware corporate fiduciary duties in the context of a single
decision made by the dominant shareholder-directors of a private Delaware forprofit corporation with three shareholders.26 The Delaware Supreme Court has
not, as a juridical body, written an opinion that confirms or rejects the analysis of
the court in eBay, whether for a privately held or publicly held corporation,
whether for a corporation with few or many shareholders, or otherwise.
Moreover, facts analogous to those in eBay, when analyzed in the context of a
similar claim under the corporate law of a state other than Delaware, may yield a
different legal conclusion.27 In addition, an argument can be made for looking at
individual board decisions not in isolation but, instead, as part of an ongoing
record of board decision-making. A corporate board manages through its
cumulative decisions, each one having value and context based on the others.
Overall, the relatively narrow factual and legal context of eBay should be
factored into a use of the case in deciding on the appropriate choice of entity for a
sustainable social enterprise.
Legal doctrine does not, then, preclude the organization of sustainable
corporate enterprises as TFPCs. But it is fair to say that the choice of a TFPC for
sustainable social enterprise is not without doctrinal risk, at least in certain
circumstances, especially in Delaware.28 The outcome of any controversy
regarding the application of the shareholder wealth maximization norm to
management decision-making for a sustainable social enterprise firm organized
as a for-profit corporation is likely to be dependent on many factors, including
the statutory corporate law of the state in which the corporation is organized, the
existence of judicial precedent, management’s decision-making process, and the
rationale for the board’s (or any officer’s) decision.29

25

Stefan J. Padfield, The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in Opting Out of Shareholder
Wealth Maximization, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 415, 443 (2017).
26 The eBay court classified craigslist as a closely held corporation. For some, however, the
existence of a corporate shareholder as one of the three shareholders of the corporation may take
craigslist out of the ambit of closely held firms.
27 See, e.g., Heminway, supra note 14, at 954 (noting and quoting from a Tennessee case that
references non-shareholder constituencies).
28 Id. at 969 (“Faced with a challenge to firm-level board decision making that incorporates
significant attention to non-shareholder constituencies or non-wealth maximizing corporate
objectives benefiting or serving shareholders, directors run the risk of liability for violating a
judicial interpretation of positive law (statutory or decisional) or salient public policy.”).
29 Id. at 968-69.
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III. THEORIES OF THE CORPORATION ALLOW FOR THE USE
OF TFPCS FOR SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
A pair of authors who wrote about the separation of ownership and
control in the corporate form 85 years ago catalyzed modern theories of the
corporation.30 Agency-oriented, contractarian, stakeholder, and communitarian
Predecessor theories of the
theories—variously labeled—all followed.31
corporation included (again, variously denominated and described): the artificial
person (or entity) theory; the charter theory; the contractual theory; the trust
theory; the real (or natural) entity theory; related early embodiments of a
shareholder primacy theory; and the aggregate theory.32 Although none of the
modern or early theories of the corporation fully explain the nature of the
incorporated firm in all contexts or foretell its fate in all circumstances, all hold
some descriptive power and predictive force. Significantly, certain foundational
theoretical conceptions that emanate from public policy as expressed through
legal doctrine (especially grant or concession theories) describe the corporation
as an organization providing public benefit.33

30 See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDNER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932); see generally Joan Heminway, Theoretical and Methodological Perspectives, in THE SAGE
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 96, 97-99 (Thomas Clarke & Douglas Branson eds.,
2012) (identifying the basic attributes of Berle & Means’s formative work).
31 See Heminway, supra note 30, at 99-102; Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the
Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 785, 814-20; Eric C. Chaffee, Collaboration Theory: A
Theory of the Charitable Tax-Exempt Nonprofit Corporation, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1719, 174048 (2016) [hereinafter Chaffee, Collaboration Theory]; Eric C. Chaffee, The Origins of Corporate
Social Responsibility, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 353, 361-68 (2017) [hereinafter Chaffee, Origins]; Eric
Engle & Tetiana Danyliuk, Emulating the German Two-Tier Board and Worker Participation in
U.S. Law: A Stakeholder Theory of the Firm, 45 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 69, 92-100 (2015).
32 See Blair, supra note 31, at 799-808; Engle & Danyliuk, supra note 31, at 89-92.
33 See, e.g., Granada Inv., Inc. v. DWG Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 458-59 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (“[I]n
his discussion of the early history of business corporations, Professor Williston refers to the public
purpose of corporations; he referred to an early commentator who stated that “[t]he general intent
and end of all civil incorporations is for better government.”); Bradley T. Borden, Residual-Risk
Model for Classifying Business Arrangements, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 245, 256 (2010) (“[T]he
“grant” or “concession” theory of corporations . . . considered state law incorporation a grant or
privilege for the pursuit of a public purpose.”); Iris H-Y Chiu, Institutional Shareholders As
Stewards: Toward A New Conception of Corporate Governance, 6 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
387, 408 (2012) (“The concession theory is based on the organized collectivity of the corporation
as an extension of certain social purposes . . . .”); Gwendolyn J. Gordon, Environmental
Personhood, 43 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 49, 64 (2018) (“This concession theory of
the corporation underlay a legal regime that operated to make corporations purpose-limited and
generally public works oriented enterprises.”); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990
DUKE L.J. 201 (“According to one view, corporate activity has broad social and political
ramifications that justify a body of corporate law that is deliberately responsive to public interest
concerns.”); David G. Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
253, 256 (2009) (“Large, publicly traded corporations take their present powerful form because of
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A significant number of current scholars posit a more private, internally
focused conception of the corporation—a shareholder wealth maximization
theory of the firm that builds from the shareholder-director conflicts identified in
agency theory and related shareholder primacy notions and refutes (or at least
subverts) the long-theorized public nature of the corporation.34 Under a
shareholder wealth maximization theory, the board manages the corporation
primarily for the financial wellbeing of its shareholders. For many, this
continues to be a dominant depiction of the corporate form—one that explains
corporate governance in application, guides director conduct, and predicts the
outcome of corporate governance disputes. One commentator observed that
“the eBay case can be interpreted as the codification of the shareholder wealth
maximization theory.”35
Yet the shareholder wealth maximization theory, like earlier theories,
fails to adequately explain certain types of corporations and aspects of corporate
existence.36 For example, the shareholder wealth maximization theory does not
satisfactorily describe, guide, or predict individual internal governance decisions
of a for-profit social enterprise corporation, just as the Delaware Court of
Chancery opinion in the eBay case does not fully explain the applicability of the
shareholder wealth maximization norm as a matter of legal doctrine. Explanatory
and predictive shortcomings of extant theory beg for the generation of new
theoretical depictions that fill the gaps or provide a more comprehensive
conception.
As a result, stakeholder and other communitarian (or collective) theories
of the corporation have emerged. These theories bridge the more starkly public
and private theoretical representations of the corporation by expressly
acknowledging the roles and interrelationships of various internal and external
corporate constituents.

concessions bestowed on them by the state. . . . The state can legitimately grant these concessions
only if it does so to advance a public purpose.”); see also Blair, supra note 31, at 800 (“Through the
first half of the nineteenth century in the United States, corporate status was granted increasingly
for business purposes, but was primarily reserved for business activities that were understood as
having some sort of public benefit . . . .”); Millon, supra, at 207 (“At least through the mid-19th
century, incorporation primarily for private business objectives was relatively unusual. Instead, the
typical corporation was chartered to pursue some sort of public function.”).
34 See, e.g., Engle & Danyliuk, supra note 31, at 92 (“When Milton Friedman first, and most
famously, argued that the only duty of the corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth, he based
his arguments on a theory of the corporation as contract and agency . . . .”).
35 Michele Benedetto Neitz, Hobby Lobby and Social Justice: How the Supreme Court Opened the
Door for Socially Conscious Investors, 68 SMU L. REV. 243, 248 (2015).
36 See, e.g., Engle & Danyliuk, supra note 31, at 93-98 (starting by noting that “the theory that the
corporation is but a nexus of contracts and that, consequently, the directors are mere agents, whose
only duty is the maximization of shareholders’ wealth is legally inaccurate and economically
simplistic”
and,
after
arguing
the
point,
concluding
that
“the shareholder wealth maximization theory, is incomplete, even incoherent.”).
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[M]ost contemporary corporate scholars tend to assume that
directors’ proper role is to maximize the economic interests of
the corporation’s shareholders. Recent years, however, have seen
the rise of a second, opposing camp of theorists known as
“communitarians” or “progressives.” These scholars object to
shareholder primacy on normative grounds, and argue that directors ought to be required to run corporations with due regard
for the interests of other potential stakeholders such as
employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, or the local
community.37
These theories are generally seen to be more descriptive of and friendly to TFPCs
that pursue corporate social responsibility or sustainable social enterprise because
they conceptualize a private benefit for corporate constituents but, unlike the
shareholder wealth maximization and other shareholder primacy theories, do not
focus on members of any particular constituency as primary beneficiaries of the
corporation in all decision-making contexts.
A popular example of a collective theoretical conception of the
corporation is the team production theory.38 Applied most frequently to public
corporations, the team production theory describes a firm in which “productive
activity requires the combined investment and coordinated effort of two or more
individuals or groups.”39 That coordination occurs through the board of
directors.40
In other words, boards exist not to protect shareholders per se,
but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the
members of the corporate “team,” including shareholders,
managers, rank and file employees, and possibly other groups,
such as creditors. Because this view challenges the shareholder
primacy norm that has come to dominate the theoretical
literature, our analysis appears to parallel many of the arguments
raised in recent years by the “communitarian” or “progressive”
school of corporate scholars who believe that corporate law
ought to require directors to serve not only the shareholders’

37

Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247, 287 (1999).
38 Id. at 249.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 251; see also Padfield, supra note 25, at 416 (“[T]eam production theory aligns with
director primacy in locating decision-making power in the board, but conceives of the goal as
mediating the often conflicting interests of the various corporate stakeholders in order to allow the
corporation to optimally fulfill its various obligations in an arguably sustainable way.”).
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interests, but also those of employees, consumers, creditors, and
other corporate “stakeholders.”41
Because the management of a sustainable social enterprise firm prioritizes both
shareholder wealth and the firm’s social enterprise mission, team production
theory offers a description of the corporation consistent with sustainable social
enterprise.
A newer communitarian theory of the firm that bears mentioning here is
collaboration theory.42 Collaboration theory, posited by Professor Eric Chaffee,
“views the corporation as a collaborative effort among a state government and
those individuals organizing, operating, and owning the business entity. The
collaborative effort may even extend beyond those entities to other entities, such
as customers, debtholders, and society in general.”43
While the collaboration theory has not been applied specifically to
sustainable social enterprises, it has been applied to for-profit corporations
operating in a socially responsible manner.44 In this context, collaboration theory
credits the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders, but the corporation
must seek profit to the exclusion of social responsibility in certain circumstances
because of the nature of the corporation’s collaboration with the state.45 The
collaboration between the state and a sustainable social enterprise includes as
essential terms both an obligation to seek profit and a commitment to its social
enterprise purpose. Governance decision-making in a TFPC organized as a
sustainable social enterprise may therefore be more consistent with the
collaboration theory than decision-making in a TFPC that adheres to corporate
social responsibility principles.
In a recently published essay, Professor Stefan Padfield reinforces the
tenets of collaboration theory and relates them expressly and directly to both
private ordering and director decision making in the TFPC:
[P]roponents of socially responsible corporate behavior may
leverage Professor Chaffee’s collaboration theory to emphasize,
perhaps by way of corporate charter or bylaw, that socially
responsible corporate behavior should only be found to violate
the shareholder wealth maximization norm when it clearly
undermines shareholder wealth. In all other situations, including
where the corporate socially responsible behavior is shareholder

41

Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory, supra note 37 at 253 (footnote omitted).
See Chaffee, Collaboration Theory, supra note 31; Chaffee, Origins, supra note 31.
43 Chaffee, Origins, supra note 31, at 371.
44 Id. at 374-78.
45 Id. at 377. (“[B]ecause of the collaboration forged with the government to promote economic
growth, a for-profit corporation has an obligation to seek profit, even if it involves acting in a
socially irresponsible manner.”).
42
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wealth enhancing, neutral, or has an uncertain impact on
shareholder wealth, a board may pursue the socially responsible
behavior without violating its obligation to maximize
shareholder value, and may even pre-commit to pursuing
socially responsible behavior in all these cases.46
Professor Padfield’s reflections offer a specific path forward for sustainable
social enterprises that desire to organize as TFPCs, especially in jurisdictions in
which extant corporate law may be unclear on the application of the shareholder
wealth maximization norm in a specific situation, allowing for the introduction of
stakeholder theory to fill gaps. Accordingly, in an action against corporate
managers for breach of fiduciary duty in a jurisdiction and context that allows
theory to be offered to explain and support the managers’ actions, collaboration
theory holds promise.47
Although the analysis provided here only touches momentarily on a few
significant and relevant theories of the corporation, these theories do not argue
against the organization of a sustainable social enterprise as a TFPC. Although
shareholder wealth maximization theory appears on its face to be inconsistent
with the reality and prospects of a sustainable social enterprise firm, it does not

46

Padfield, supra note 25, at 452 (footnote omitted).
Professor Padfield argues more broadly in his essay that corporate personality theory should play
a stronger role in describing, guiding, and predicting internal corporate affairs than it has played to
date. He describes corporate personality theory as follows:
47

Assuming corporate personhood, corporate personality theory addresses what
type of person the corporation should be treated as. The traditional theories of
corporate personality are: (1) artificial entity or concession theory, (2)
aggregate or contractarian theory, and (3) real entity theory. Professor Eric
Chaffee has recently argued for a fourth theory: collaboration theory.
Padfield, supra note 25, at 444 (footnotes omitted). He notes, among other things, that
[c]orporate personality theory tends to come up more frequently in discussions
of the government’s ability to regulate corporations, as opposed to discussions
of the allocation of power among the primary private corporate stakeholders . . .
. However, the lines between external regulation of corporations and their
internal affairs can quickly blur, and this Essay will argue, among other things,
that corporate personality theory has a role to play in the corporate governance
debates surrounding shareholder wealth maximization.
Id. at 418 (footnote omitted). Ultimately, he concludes, in an argument consistent with the
assertions made in this essay about collaboration theory more specifically,
that corporate personality theory can be useful both in debates about the
viability of opting out of shareholder wealth maximization, as well as in
providing a framework for maximizing the ability of corporations to engage in
socially responsible behavior within the shareholder wealth maximization
framework.
Id. at 453.
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repudiate sustainable social enterprise.
Moreover, shareholder wealth
maximization theory may not be as powerful a descriptor of the corporation as
communitarian theories of the corporation—like the team production and
collaboration theories—that take into account both the public and private
attributes of the corporate form. These communitarian conceptions provide more
comprehensive descriptions of a broader variety of corporations and their
governance features rooted in state corporate law. Accordingly, various popular,
compelling theories of the corporation are consistent with sustainable social
enterprise.
IV. POLICIES UNDERLYING CORPORATE LAW ALLOW FOR
THE USE OF TFPCS FOR SUSTAINABLE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
Corporate law, like other business entity laws, exists at its core to
provide business venturers with an off-the-rack set of immutable and default
rules to govern their business and, to some extent, that business’s relationship
with third parties.48 This time-tested legal framework comprising structural,
governance, third-party liability, and financial norms offers constituents an
alternative to establishing their business venture through individually negotiated
organic documents, instruments, and contracts.49 In this way, corporate statutes
and related decisional law, like the parallel elements of doctrine applicable for
the formation of other business associations, offer efficacious, legally
enforceable rubrics for business formation, conduct, and maintenance. This
general public policy objective underlies business entity law in general and
corporate law specifically, as a subset of the law of business associations.
Yet, despite this common central objective, the law governing each form
of statutory business entity is, within the greater law of business associations,
distinct in individual aspects. Accordingly, each body of business entity law has
its own separate subsidiary policy underpinnings. Corporate law is no exception.
Moreover, each state may have its own distinct public policy goals in adopting
and amending corporate law generally and in its specific aspects.50 Policy

48 See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchison, Choice, Progressive Values, and Corporate Law: A Reply to
Greenfield, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437, 449 (2010); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate
Law and Governance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1328 (2013); Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder
Bylaws, Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 237 (2005).
49 See, e.g., R. Kymn Harp, Give Them Their Due Due Diligence in Commercial Real Estate
Transactions, PROB. & PROP., July/August 2011, at 40, 41 (referencing “[e]ntity organizational
documents, such as the following: for a corporation, the corporate charter and bylaws and, in some
cases, shareholder agreement and/or voting trust agreement.”).
50 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. &
ECON. 383, 399-400 (2003) (offering that “[d]ifferent types of firms have different needs,
and states might provide a corporate law system especially fitting for the type of firms most
represented in the state.”); Michael Vargas, supra note 20, at 2 (noting that
“[t]he differences [instate benefit corporation statutes] may reflect the corporate law culture of
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determinations may depend on unique attributes of state government, related
state functions and considerations (e.g., revenue generation through taxation and
otherwise and specific reputational concerns), and different understandings of
legal or economic theory and its implications in context. For instance, Delaware
(as a national leader in corporate chartering) may have different public policy
objectives in constituting and maintaining its corporate law than Tennessee may
have.51
Most important, perhaps, are the state public policy judgments
underlying immutable corporate law rules—rules that corporate promoters and
constituents cannot agree around by specified or general private prescription.
These rules typically reflect important, core public policy concerns. They are
non-negotiable elements of the state’s corporate doctrine.
In a recent article published in the Delaware Journal of Corporate Law,
Professor David Yosifon set forth his view on the fundamental public policy
objectives of mandatory provisions in corporate law:
There are three basic justifications for having mandatory
corporate law rules. First, mandatory rules might protect
vulnerable parties to the corporate contract (especially
shareholders) from exploitation that could occur under a privateordering regime. Second, mandatory rules might protect against
the externalization of harms to third-parties (especially workers,
consumers, and communities) brought on by other people's
private agreements. Third, mandatory rules may induce efficient,
socially desirable “network effects” in organizational design that
would not be realized in a system that allowed privatethe state, with Delaware taking the most flexible and management-friendly approach, or they may
reflect an evolution in the law.”).
51 In fact, recent evidence of public policy differences between Delaware and Tennessee in the
entity law area were revealed in the course of Tennessee’s recent revision of its limited partnership
law. See Joan Heminway, Limited Partnership Law: Should Tennessee Follow Delaware’s Lead
On Fiduciary Duty Private Ordering?, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: BUS. L. PROF BLOG (Sept.
5, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2016/09/limited-partnership-law-shouldtennessee-follow-delawares-lead-on-fiduciary-duty-private-ordering.html. Delaware and Tennessee
laws and policies are used here merely as representative examples. A similar observation could be
made about the difference between and among the business entity laws of other jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Robert C. Holmes, Benefits of Incorporating in Delaware Versus New Jersey: Busting the
Myth and Closing the Gap, 11 RUTGERS BUS. L. REV. 1, 33 (2014) (“[T]he New Jersey brand
for corporate law will be based on public policies that go beyond merely increasing the revenue
base of the state or supporting the local bar.”). The public policy underlying Delaware’s corporate
law may be particularly distinctive, of course, because of the sheer volume and strong influence of
Delaware corporations. Over 40 years ago, a respected commentator described Delaware’s
corporate law as a function of “public policy based upon the production of revenue, pride in being
‘number one,’ and the creation of a ‘favorable climate’ for new incorporations.” William L.
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 672 (1974).
The public policy underlying Delaware’s corporate law could be described in much the same way
today.
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ordering.52
These objectives are largely noncontroversial. The protection of potentially
vulnerable corporate constituents and the desirability or benefits of maintaining
common, standardized rules as among corporate law adopters (the concept
underlying network effects, also known as network benefits)53 all seem
creditable. These policy justifications form a basis for assessing the value of
corporate law generally, as well the relative benefits for sustainable social
enterprises of the law governing TFPCs and the law governing benefit
corporations (as the leading form of social enterprise entity).
A corporation does not exist until a chartering document is filed with the
secretary of state of the state of organization.54 This is an immutable rule;
incorporation is a process defined and governed by statutory law, and corporate
constituents cannot vary it.55 Managers, owners, suppliers, and creditors of a
corporation, among others, count on that public filing to help identify and protect
their rights and benefits. Uncertainty costs are minimized; predictability is
enhanced. These are clear benefits of the corporation that incentivize people to
use it and interact with it.

52 David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit Corporation
Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 492-93 (2017) (footnotes omitted).
53 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 725 (1997) (defining
“network benefits” in contracting as the “set of advantages is available to a firm that adopts a
contract term that is or will become contemporaneously used by many firms for a significant period
of time.”); Brett H. McDonnell, Getting Stuck Between Bottom and Top: State Competition for
Corporate Charters in the Presence of Network Effects, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 681, 700 (2003)
(“Network and learning effects refer to mechanisms whereby a leading company, technology,
standard, or, in our case, state, becomes more attractive to new adopters of the item in question
simply by virtue of being the leader. New adopters therefore tend to adopt the leader, which
increases its lead, making it yet more attractive to newer adopters, and so on in a self-reinforcing
cycle.” (footnotes omitted)).
54 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(a) (“Any person . . . may incorporate or organize a
corporation . . . by filing with the Division of Corporations in the Department of State a certificate
of incorporation . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-103(a) (“Unless a delayed effective date is
specified, the corporate existence begins when the charter is filed by the secretary of state.”).
55 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 106 (“Upon the filing with the Secretary of State of the
certificate of incorporation, . . . the incorporator or incorporators who signed the certificate, and
such incorporator's or incorporators' successors and assigns, shall, from the date of such filing, be
and constitute a body corporate, by the name set forth in the certificate . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-12-103(b) (“The secretary of state's filing of the charter is conclusive proof that the
incorporators satisfied all conditions precedent to incorporation . . . .”); see also Ilya Beylin, Tax
Authority As Regulator and Equity Holder: How Shareholders' Control Rights Could Be Adapted
to Serve the Tax Authority, 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 851, 864 (2010)
(“Incorporation requires the filing of a certificate of incorporation, or analogous charter document,
with an officer of a state.”).
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Similarly, directors and officers of a corporation owe fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty to the corporation.56 While these duties can be tailored a bit,
they cannot be eliminated; in other words, their existence—but not their exact
nature and contents—is an immutable rule of corporate law.57 Shareholders, in
particular, rely on the protections provided by this immutable aspect of
corporations in choosing to invest in a firm organized as a corporation, but
employees, creditors, and other internal and external corporate constituents also
may feel more secure in associating with corporations because fiduciary duties
protect their interests, albeit (in most cases) less directly. Corporations became
and remain attractive to those who organize them because of this standard
feature, when taken together with other corporate attributes (including, e.g.,
limited liability). Even with the advent of limited liability companies (which
combine some of the desirable immutable rules of corporations with enhanced
structural flexibility and more opportunities for private ordering), most firms that
offer equity to the public are corporations,58 and most venture capitalists prefer to

56 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301(a) (“A director shall discharge all duties as a director,
including duties as a member of a committee: (1) In good faith; (2) With the care an ordinarily
prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) In a manner
the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”); Gantler v. Stephens,
965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del. 2009) (“In the past, we have implied that officers of Delaware
corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and that the fiduciary duties of
officers are the same as those of directors. We now explicitly so hold.”); Stone ex rel. AmSouth
Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he obligation to act in good faith
does not establish an independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of
care and loyalty. Only the latter two duties, where violated, may directly result in liability, whereas
a failure to act in good faith may do so, but indirectly.”).
57 See, e.g., Kelli A. Alces, Strengthening Investment in Public Corporations Through the
U.
L.
REV.
1009,
1013
(2012)
Uncorporation,
35
SEATTLE
(“The board of directors, mandatory fiduciary duties, and capital lock-in are the defining features of
the corporate form.”); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate
Law Evolution, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 489, 506–07 (2002) (“For many years,
the fiduciary duties imposed on corporate directors have been a mandatory component of state
corporate law. In the mid-1980s, however, many states decided to adopt an enabling approach to
this issue and grant public companies some choice regarding the scope of director liability.”
(footnote omitted)); Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 465, 473 (2009) ([C]orporate law . . . imposes upon managers certain fiduciary duties, a
legally enforceable minimum standard of conduct developed by courts and intended to ensure
managerial accountability.”); Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1579 (1993) (“Corporate law . . . provides that corporate power must
be exercised according to certain mandatory rules . . . . Fiduciary duties of directors and
management are . . . mandatory.”).
58 See, e.g., Steven C. Alberty, The S Corporation: Your Best Choice for an Established Small
Business, PRAC. LAW., December 2003, at 11, 15 (“Publicly traded businesses
are most often organized as C corporations, although some publicly traded investment ventures take
the form of limited partnerships or limited liability companies.”); Healy et al., A Guide to
Takeovers in the United States, 41 THE LAWYER'S BRIEF 2 (Apr. 5, 2011) (“Most domestic
U.S. publicly traded businesses are organized as corporations.”); Manesh, supra note 57, at 469
(“[A]lmost all publicly traded companies are organized as corporations”).
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invest in businesses organized as corporations (although this may be at least in
part for tax and financial reasons).59
TFPCs share these and certain other immutable rules with other
corporations, including benefit corporations (as well as other social enterprise
corporate forms). However, the public policy underpinnings of TFPCs and
benefit corporations differ (mainly as to the role that public benefit plays in
management decision making),60 resulting in different immutable governance
rules. Although they vary from state to state, many benefit corporation statutes
mandate organization for a general public benefit, and all mandate either a
general or specific public benefit.61 Many benefit corporation statutes require the
filing of benefit reports; some require specified benefit corporation directors or
officers.62 Finally, director decision-making and fiduciary duty standards of
conduct and liability are tailored to achievement of both shareholder and public
benefits.63

59

See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital Start-Ups,
57 TAX L. REV. 137, 185 (2003) (“[T]he venture capitalist’s rational emphasis on the tax treatment
of gains, not losses, and the various tax and nontax advantages of the corporate form make the
corporation the preferred vehicle for financing a venture capital start-up.”); Calvin H. Johnson, Why
Do Venture Capital Funds Burn Research and Development Deductions?, 29 VA. TAX REV. 29, 60
(2009) (“Published accounts have said that use of C corporations ‘might be explained partly by
lawyers’ self-interest in guiding clients toward the corporate form in which lawyers can use their
existing expertise.’”); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Teaching Business Organizations from A
Transactional Perspective, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777, 781 (2015) (noting
“venture capitalists' preference for investing in C corporations”); Matthew Wolf, Delving Deeper
into Your Choice of Business Entity, 27 WESTLAW J. DEL. CORP. 1, 3 (2012)
(“[V]enture capitalists prefer C corps.”).
60 See, e.g., Felicia R. Resor, Benefit Corporation Legislation, 12 WYO. L. REV. 91, 112 (2012)
(“Benefit corporation legislation offers voluntary solutions to enhance corporate social
responsibility because a corporation's founders, directors, and shareholders can define their own
social or environmental purpose as opposed to abiding by one mandated by state or federal
regulation.”). Professor Yosifon has suggested the potential for a narrow conception of this policy
objective in which the benefit corporation is viewed as an exclusive, rather than voluntary, option
for corporations desiring to pursue a public benefit purpose. See Yosifon, supra note 52, at 480 (“It
might be argued that the presence of the PBC within the corporate code implies that the policy of
the General Corporation Law is to offer the Public Benefit Corporation, rather than open-ended
private ordering, as the sole alternative to shareholder primacy in corporate governance.”). See
also infra note 70 and accompanying text.
61 See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held
U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 618-19 (2017).
62 See id. at 621.
63
See id. at 622-25. In sum,
[t]he statutory expressions of benefit corporation management fiduciary duties
differ from state to state. However, in each U.S. benefit corporation law, there
is an unsurprising, fundamental anchoring proposition: the law requires
directors (and, as applicable, officers) to consider the corporation’s public
benefit in addition to any financial interest of shareholders.
Id. at 625.
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The immutable rules specific to benefit corporations create additional
costs—costs associated with, e.g., extra reporting requirements and mandatory,
untested structural and governance rules—that may not provide a net benefit to
shareholders and other investors. These costs and attendant litigation risks also
cast doubt on the aggregate advantages of benefit corporations to other
stakeholders. None may feel well protected when taking into account the overall
effects of the benefit corporation’s unique immutable rules. Perhaps as a result
of this, social enterprise firms have not flocked in the expected numbers to the
benefit corporation form.64 Network benefits are predicted but have not yet been
fully realized.
Thus, the policy rationales for immutable rules forwarded by Professor
Yosifon support the organization of sustainable social enterprise firms as TFPCs.
Moreover, the potential for private ordering for sustainable social enterprise
firms organized as TFPCs (which Professor Yosifon acknowledges is a
possibility—even under Delaware law65) may compliment the TFPC’s immutable
rules while limiting the possible detriments of its default rules in the sustainable
social enterprise context. Among other things, a transparent, charter-based
corporate purpose enables shareholders and third parties contracting and
interacting with the corporation to evaluate, understand, and address exploitation
risks ex ante—or refrain from investing in or engaging with the corporation.
Although this may work out differently in closely held, privately held, and
publicly held firms (based on their unique attributes), in each case, shareholder
and other protections can be built into the firm’s chartering documents together
with a statement of the agreed sustainable social enterprise purpose of the firm.
Finally, it seems important to note (in terms of network effects) that
TFPCs have been and continue to be a friendly alternative for existing and newly
forming social enterprises.66 Only the passage of time will permit an evaluation
of the benefit corporation’s ability to rival, for instance, the relative certainty and

64

See id. at 613-14.
See Yosifon, supra note 52, at 497 (“In summary, then, it seems that neither the Delaware
statutory scheme, nor Delaware's common law, nor broader public policy justifications point in
favor of prohibiting privately-ordered deviation from shareholder primacy in business corporations,
even after the PBC innovation.”). This author addresses the same issue but is less certain than
Professor Yosifon. Heminway, supra note 14, at 966 (“The accumulated evidence is at best unclear
about whether a public or private firm incorporated in or outside Delaware can engage in private
ordering in its charter to include a corporate purpose that may be interpreted in a manner
inconsistent with the shareholder wealth maximization norm.”).
66
See Heminway, supra note 14, at 965 (“[M]any existing social enterprise firms
are organized under the for-profit corporation laws in states adopting benefit corporation statutes-either because these entities were incorporated before adoption of the benefit corporation
provisions or because the firms do not want to or cannot by their nature opt into other aspects of the
benefit corporation form.”); Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and Shareholder Profit,
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 174–75 (2016) (“[M]any for-profit corporations have pursued the
creation of a public benefit despite historical uncertainty over the compatibility of such an objective
with the fiduciary duties owed to the corporation and its shareholders.”).
65
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predictability of the TFPC in its many aspects.67 “If the PBC is a desirable form,
it will be used and its use will become ever cheaper over time as precedents make
it more predictable.”68
V. CONCLUSION
The rapid growth of social enterprise business entity laws in the United
States presents challenges to longstanding corporate law doctrine, theory, and
policy. As a result, the rise of alternative corporate forms for use in social
enterprise generates questions relevant to legal practitioners, the judiciary,
academics, and lawmakers.69 These questions point to potential detriments and
benefits of laws governing social enterprise forms of entity as currently
constituted and as applied over the long term.
For example, law scholars have begun to raise concerns that social
enterprise legal forms may be undesirable because they reinforce the doctrinal
application of shareholder wealth maximization norms well beyond the factual
scenario presented in the eBay decision, both in and outside the State of
Delaware.70 In the process, the hands of corporate directors in TFPCs and benefit
corporations may be tied in some circumstances because their decision-making
discretion is narrowed.71 These consequences may in turn have the effect of
decreasing the relevance or power of director primacy theories of corporate
control (since the directors’ and officers’ decision-making is constrained to some
extent by legal doctrine) and increasing the salience of shareholder wealth
maximization theory by sharpening that theory’s descriptive and predictive
effects in TFPC management fiduciary duty disputes.72 These changes may be

67

See Murray, supra note 1, at 586 ([A]t this early stage it is difficult to tell whether any of the
current social enterprise laws will prove attractive enough to draw large numbers of entities.”).
68 Yosifon, supra note 52, at 497.
69 Entrepreneurs and business promoters also have been wrestling with these questions, especially
those that raise important choice of entity issues. See, e.g., An Entrepreneur’s Guide to Certified B
Corporations
and
Benefit
Corporations,
http://cbey.yale.edu/sites/default/files/CBEY_BCORP_Online.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2018).
70
See, e.g., Tu, supra note 66, at 172-74 (concluding that “the existence
of Benefit Corporation statutes may have the unintended consequence of being construed as a
legislative mandate that, under corporate law, considering broader stakeholder interest and creating
a public benefit is wholly prohibited unless a business has opted to organize or reincorporate as
a Benefit Corporation.”).
71 See, e.g., Joshua P. Fershee, The End of Responsible Growth and Governance?: The Risks Posed
by Social Enterprise Enabling Statutes and the Demise of Director Primacy, 19 TRANSACTIONS:
TENN. J. BUS. L. 361, 362 (2017) (“There are two emerging issues that, working together, run the
risk of derailing large-scale socially responsible business decisions: the emergence of social
enterprise enabling statutes and the demise of director primacy. These issues could have the parallel
impacts of limiting business leader creativity and risk taking.”).
72 See id. at 362-63 (“Now that many states have alternative social enterprise entity structures, there
is an increased risk that traditional entities will be viewed . . . as pure profit vehicles, eliminating
directors’ ability to make choices with the public benefit in mind, even where the public benefit is
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occurring in the absence of any conscious or rigorous consideration of public
policy and, therefore, may not well serve articulated, assumed, or aspirational
policy objectives. In sum, the stringent application of shareholder wealth
maximization doctrine in the TFPC and the nature of benefit corporation doctrine
conspire to decrease director discretion within the overall bounds of the board’s
authority and, in turn, negatively impact the significance of the board decisionmaking process under corporate law.
Professor Yosifon has expressed concern along these lines about the
judicial and practical effects of the benefit corporation on social enterprise firms
organized as TFPCs. He offers advice on how to proceed in a manner that has
fewer deleterious effects:
The Public Benefit Corporation should be understood as a “menu
option,” which promoters may select if they desire a highly specific form
of multi-stakeholder governance with a recognizable “brand.” But
promoters remain free to order “off the menu,” and get their own multistakeholder corporate design. Delaware jurists would be wise to make
this clear in case law. The Delaware legislature would be prudent to
sustain these conclusions through statutory clarification, before the
exigencies of litigation end up making bad law on the issue.73
This advice is welcomed and I endorse it here.
However, shareholder primacists may predictably argue that social
enterprise forms of entity are not only desirable, but also may, in fact, be needed
to provide a clear structural and governance outlet for social enterprise firms,
including sustainable social enterprises. Otherwise, these firms may organize as
TPFCs and engage in private ordering to achieve the analogous results.
Relatively unfettered private ordering of this kind—to effectively achieve a
double or triple bottom line in a TFPC—compromises the validity and value of
shareholder primacy theory and, more particularly, shareholder wealth
maximization as a matter of doctrine, theory, and policy. Professor Yosifon
notes the potential argument that benefit corporations may be needed to ensure
shareholder value protections that may not be available under the law governing
TFPCs.74
With all of this in mind, this essay makes a simple, related (and arguably
foundational) contribution to the ongoing discussion—one that offers caution to
adherents to both director and shareholder primacy theories of corporate control.
The contribution is merely this: under existing corporate law doctrine, theory,
and policy, sustainable social enterprises have been, are being, and may be
also good for business . . . .”).
73 See Yosifon, supra note 52, at 507.
74 See id. at 493-94 (“A single alternative to the shareholder primacy norm, represented by the
PBC, may be necessary to ensure that shareholders are protected in their investments in hybrid
enterprises.”).
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properly and profitably formed, and may continue to exist, as TFPCs—even with
the relatively new introduction of benefit corporations and other social enterprise
forms of entity. Admittedly, the conclusions drawn on these matters are to some
extent contentious and contended in the literature. Shareholder wealth
maximization norm advocates and shareholder primacy theorists, for instance,
are likely to argue to the contrary.
There is ample evidence (only some of which has been presented here in
light of time and space limitations) that the TFPC continues to be, at least in
some states, a very flexible tool.75 The TFPC has public benefit roots in legal
doctrine, theory, and policy. It has weathered many political and economic
storms.
Social enterprise entities may raise new concerns, however. Attendant
benefits of social enterprise entity legislation have been identified.76
Nevertheless, but for a limited number of judicial opinions—exemplified most
recently and clearly in the Delaware Court of Chancery’s opinion in the eBay
case—there should not have been and would not be a need for legislative action
to adopt new social enterprise forms of entity. The law governing TFPCs largely
offers what sustainable social enterprise needs.77 Indeed, new social enterprise
entities arguably add unnecessary complexity to the choice of entity equation.78

75

See, e.g., Khatib, supra note 3, at 189 (pointing out, among other advantages, that “[t]he
traditional for-profit provides for greater flexibility in decision making without potentially deterring
investors who fear that the statutory benefit corporation absolves directors of traditional
accountability.”).
76 See id. (“[T]here are certain inherent advantages that benefit corporation status provides—like
raising “patient” capital along with marketing and branding incentives.”); Yockey, supra note 20, at
770 (“[I]t is . . . plausible that the benefit corporation form will fill an important market gap by
helping socially oriented entrepreneurs reach a more pro-social investor class.”); id. (“[T]he value
of the benefit corporation form comes from its ability to create an important new institutional
structure to govern the evolving social enterprise space.”).
77 See Khatib, supra note 3, at 188 (“The takeaway is that the existing traditional for-profit legal
framework provides all of the benefits of social enterprise without introducing the slew of problems
associated with the fledgling benefit corporation.”); Yockey, supra note 20, at 770 (“[C]orporate
law already provides entrepreneurs with much of what the benefit corporation form claims to
offer.”).
78 See, e.g., Justin Blount & Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A Questionable
Solution to A Non-Existent Problem, 44 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617, 663 (2013) (“Creating new corporate
forms and other “hybrid” entities only serves to perpetuate the myth that business corporations do
not have the flexibility to pursue social missions or benefit stakeholders besides shareholders.”);
Tu, supra note 66, at 167 (“Because the traditional for-profit corporation arguably provides a form
that is flexible enough to accommodate the pursuit of a public benefit, the addition of
the Benefit Corporation may needlessly complicate the existing legal framework.”).
One
commentator offers a particularly harsh critique of the additional, unnecessary complexity created
by social enterprise legislation (what he terms “SEL”):
While SEL has a potentially charitable aim, I argue that contrepreneurs have
advanced a deceptive maze of needless SEL using ethically-questionable
marketing. In addition to this deception, contrepreneurs have attempted to
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The conclusion I reach here should be of comfort to sustainable social
enterprise entities formed and, in some cases, long existing as TFPCs.79 State
benefit corporation statutes generally include language indicating that the
enactment and existence of the benefit corporation law should have no effect on
the validity or interpretation of for-profit corporate law outside the benefit
corporation context.80 Nevertheless, managers or principals of sustainable social
enterprise corporations may have believed—and continue to believe—that there
is cause for alarm. The brief analysis offered here provides a path for argument
that these social enterprises may continue to safely and productively operate as
TFPCs. Increased public education of entrepreneurs, business promoters, and
legal counsel can help correct oversimplified conceptions of TFPCs, especially
those organized outside Delaware, and social enterprise entities (especially
benefit corporations) that appear to be drivers of entity choice.81
The conclusion that corporate law doctrine, theory, and policy do not
preclude sustainable social enterprises from organizing as TFPCs also is relevant
to state legislatures. States that have not adopted specialized social enterprise
entity statutes may find no reason to do so. States that have benefit corporation
or other social enterprise entity statutes—perhaps falsely believing that they
needed to have these statutes for doctrinal reasons if they wanted to support and
sustain social enterprise82—may reconsider and (as North Carolina did with its
L3C statute) repeal their social enterprise entity laws. At the least, state general
assemblies should consider clarifying the availability of the TFPC form for
sustainable social enterprises (and clarifying more specifically the ability of
TFPCs to lawfully provide for enforceable sustainable social benefit purposes in
their chartering documents).83
The judiciary also may find some value in the brief arguments made
here. In this regard, among other things, this essay is intended to demonstrate
silence political and legal counter narratives, and have created self-reinforcing
laws to support a cottage industry that serves their own interests, not society's.
That cottage industry and SEL may allow managers to engage in valuedestructive and morally hazardous behaviors that would otherwise lead to
liability claims under traditional corporate law.
David Groshoff, Contrepreneurship? Examining Social Enterprise Legislation's Feel-Good
Governance Giveaways, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 233, 234 (2013).
79 See Khatib, supra note 3, at 189 (noting that “there are examples of social enterprises
maintaining their traditional for-profit status even with the availability of the benefit corporation,
demonstrating the suitability of the traditional for-profit for social enterprises.”).
80 See Heminway, supra note 14, at 964-65 n.77 and accompanying text.
81
See Blount & Offei-Danso, supra note 78, at 663 (“If social entrepreneurs feel constrained within
the current legal framework, the appropriate reaction is to better educate entrepreneurs about the
flexibility they have within this framework to operate as a socially-minded company.”).
82 See Khatib, supra note 3, at 188 (“Many legal commentators and supporters of benefit
corporation legislation have utilized fears exacerbated by the holdings in Revlon and eBay to help
propel the benefit corporation into the mainstream.”).
83 See Yosifon, supra note 52, at 507 (stating that the Delaware legislature “would be prudent” to
make a clarification of this kind).
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that the eBay opinion may be limited in application to its jurisdiction or its facts.
As such, courts should be cautious in relying on eBay as support in other
jurisdictions or circumstances in which the fiduciary duty of directors of
sustainable social enterprises organized as TFPCs may be at issue because of the
corporation’s social enterprise mission. The judiciary also can offer helpful
clarification regarding the availability of the TFPC for sustainable social
enterprise if the appropriate case presents itself.84
Ultimately, state legislatures and courts will determine the role that
TFPCs will play over the long haul in sustainable social enterprise. In making
and interpreting law, these state institutions should act with due deliberation and
reflection, taking into account the current status of sustainable social enterprises
incorporated in the state, the contextual salience of applicable theory, and any
individualized public policy objectives of the state, in addition to existing
governing doctrine. Individual states may continue to choose independent paths
through their legislative and judicial decision-making.
Of course, as corporate law continues to develop, legal counsel will
continue to advise business venturers on choice of entity determinations taking
into account those very same factors. In all of these endeavors, thoughtful
consideration and debate should reign over the application of heuristics in
decision-making. The applied authority of a board of directors to manage a TFPC
is not designed or intended to be simple or turnkey. It is complex (more or less so
depending on the matter being deliberated) and requires at various times the
identification, consideration, assessment, and balancing of multiple—and
sometimes competing—interests. TFPC law uniquely positions the board of
directors to serve this function. Sustainable social enterprise is just one context in
which a TFPC board’s complex decision-making processes may productively
play themselves out. Let’s not give up on TFPCs for sustainable social enterprise.

84

See id. (suggesting that “Delaware jurists would be wise” to offer this type of clarification).

